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Abstract 
Theories  of  endogenous  growth  are  used  to  investigate  the  effect  of  environmental  policy  on  the  rate  of  economic 
growth  and  the  provision  of  public  goods  in  a  second-best  market  outcome.  Pollution  gives  rise  to  a  negative 
environmental  externality  and  is  modeled  as  an  inevitable  by-product  of  production.  The  government  faces  the  dual 
task  of,  on  the  one  hand,  internalising  environmental  externalities,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  raising  public  funds  to 
finance  public  spending.  A  tougher  environmental  policy  reduces  the  rate  of  economic  growth,  improves 
environmental  quality,  raises  the  optimal  tax  rate,  and  changes  the  composition  of  public  spending  away  from 
productive  government  spending  towards  public  consumption  and  abatement.  The  marginal  cost  of  public  funds 
falls  (rises)  if  productive  government  spending  is  negligible  (substantial)  relative  to  public  consumption  and 
abatement 
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1.  Introduction 
The  deterioration  of  the  natural  environment  is  an  important  issue  in  policy  debates 
nowadays.  Firms  and  households  pollute  too  much,  since  they  do  not  pay  the  price  for  the 
social  damages  they  cause.  This  environmental  externality  calls  for  government  intervention. 
One  of  the  instruments  at  the  government’s  disposal  is a Pigovian  tax  on  detrimental  activities. 
Such  a  tax  corrects  the  market  failure  by  raising  the  private  cost  to  the  level  of  the  social  cost. 
If  there  are  no  other  distortions  present  in  the  economy,  the  government  can  set  the  optimal 
Pigovian  tax  and  attain  the  first-best  outcome  in  a  decentralised  economy.  However,  another 
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task  of  government  is  to  raise  tax  revenue  to  finance  public  spending.  If  lump-sum  taxes  and 
subsidies  cannot  be  called  upon  to  balance  the  budget,  the  government  has  to  resort  to 
distortionary  taxes.  The  government  then  faces  the  dual  task  of  raising  revenues  to  finance 
public  goods  on  the  one  hand  and  internalising  environmental  externalities  on  the  other  hand. 
Thus,  the  relevant  problem  is the  setting  of  an  optimal  tax  in  a second-best  world  (cf.  Sandmo, 
1975;  Auerbach,  1985).  In  these  circumstances  it  is of  considerable  interest  to  study  how  more 
environmental  concern  affects  the  marginal  cost  of  public  funds.  Bovenberg  and  van  der  Ploeg 
(1994)  analyse  the  relation  between  pollution,  the  optimal  mix  of  taxes  and  the  marginal  cost 
of  public  funds  in  a  static  setting.  This  paper  investigates  the  relation  between  environmental 
policy,  public  finance  and  economic  growth.  We  analyse  the  effect  of  more  environmental 
concern  on  the  rate  of  economic  growth,  the  optimal  tax  rate,  the  composition  of  public 
spending  and  the  marginal  cost  of  public  funds.  To  this  end  we  make  use  of  endogenous 
growth  theory  as  developed  by  Romer  (1986)  among  others.  We  extend  the  work  of  Barro 
(1990)  on  endogenous  growth  and  public  finance  to  allow  for  environmental  externalities.  We 
analyse  a  second-best  world  in  which  the  government  uses  its  tax  policy  to  internalise 
environmental  externalities  as  well  as  to  raise  revenue. 
Section  2 presents  an  endogenous  growth  model  in  which  there  is  a  flow  of  pollution  and  in 
which  society  derives  positive  utility  from  private  consumption  and  government  consumption, 
and  derives  negative  utility  from  environmental  damages.  The  optimal  tax  rate  is  determined 
and  we  investigate  its  relationship  to  the  marginal  cost  of  public  funds.  In  Section  3 we  extend 
the  analysis  to  allow  for  the  effect  of  public  abatement  on  the  emission-output  ratio.  In 
Section  4  we  also  allow  for  growth-promoting  public  spending.  The  government  then  faces 
three  tasks:  (i)  internalising  a  negative  environmental  externality;  (ii)  providing  three  public 
goods,  namely  public  consumption,  public  abatement  and  productive  government  spending; 
and  (iii)  using  a  distortionary  tax  system  to  finance  public  spending.  To  get  further  insight  in 
the  properties  of  the  second-best  optimum,  we  present  some  numerical  results.  Section  5 
concludes  with  a  summary  of  the  results. 
2.  Pollution,  the  cost  of  funds  and  endogenous  growth 
2.1.  Preferences,  production  and  environmental  quality 
Consider  an  economy  with  a  large  number  of  firms  which  produce  a  homogeneous  final 
good  under  perfect  competition.  .The  production  function  of  the  representative  firm  has  the 
simple  form  Y =  AK,  where  Y and  K  denote  output  and  capital,  respectively,  while  A  stands 
for  economy-wide  production  efficiency.  Firms  maximise  profits.  Ignoring  depreciation,  the 
first-order  condition  for  a  maximum  is  r =  (1  -  T)A,  where  r  stands  for  the  market  rate  of 
interest  and  T  denotes  the  tax  rate  on  output.  . . 
Utility  of  household  j  (say,  U,)  is,  for  simplicity,  given  by  a  quasi-linear  specification: 
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damages,  respectively.  Society  attaches  a weight  qc  to  public  consumption  and  a  weight  qE  to 
environmental  quality.  Social  welfare  depends  on  private  consumption,  public  consumption 
and  environmental  quality.  Consumers  have  a  rate  of  time  preference  0  and  the  elasticity  of 
intertemporal  substitution  for  private  and  public  consumption  is  unity. 
Households  take  the  levels  of  public  consumption  and  environmental  quality  as  given,  and 
maximise  utility  (1)  subject  to  their  present  value  budget  constraint.  Hence,  the  growth  in 
private  consumption  equals  the  gap  between  the  market  rate  of  interest  and  the  rate  of  time 
preference: 
ClC=r-8,  (2) 
Eq.  (2)  is  the  familiar  Keynes-Ramsey  rule,  which  determines  the  optimal  allocation  of 
private  resources  between  current  and  future  consumption. 
Pollution  is  an  inevitable  by-product  of  production.  Environmental  damages  are  thus  given 
by  D  =  BY,  where  B  is the  emission-output  ratio.  Individual  firms  are  too  small  to  care  about 
the  flow  of  pollution  (e.g.  noise,  smoke,  etc.)  they  generate.  Of  course,  this  external  effect 
implies  that  the  decentralised  market  equilibrium  is  inefficient.  Government  policy,  in  the 
form  of  a  tax  on  output,  is  called  upon  to  fight  pollution. 
2.2.  The  government  budget  and  market  equilibrium 
The  government  finances  its  consumptive  expenditures  with  a  tax  on  production,  so  that 
G  =  7Y.  A  tax  on  output  acts  as  an  implicit  tax  on  capital,  so  that  similar  results  are  obtained 
if  the  tax  is  replaced  by  a  tax  on  capital.  We  assume  that  the  government  has  no  access  to 
lump-sum  taxes  and  subsidies.  Thus,  the  government  has  to  employ  a  distortionary  tax  for  the 
dual  task  of,  on  the  one  hand,  raising  revenues  to  finance  public  consumption,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  internalising  environmental  externalities.  Goods  market  equilibrium  requires  that 
the  supply  of  goods  equals  the  total  demand  for  goods,  i.e.  Y =  C  +  K  +  G. 
2.3.  Optimal  government  policy 
From  the  goods  market  equilibrium  condition,  the  government  budget  constraint  and  the 
production  function,  we  derive  the  growth  rate  of  capital: 
$=(l-‘,A-$. 
The  growth  rate  of  private  consumption  is low  if the  tax  rate  is high,  households  are  impatient 
(high  13) and  the  production  efficiency  of  the  economy  is  low: 
7+=(1-+-H.  (4) 
For  balanced  growth  it  is  necessary  that  the  capital  stock  and  consumption  grow  at  the  same 
rate,  i.e.  C/c  =  klK  =  7l.  This  condition  is  satisfied  if  the  consumption-capital  ratio 
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transitional  dynamics.  Balanced  growth  implies  a corresponding  rate  of  growth  in  environmen- 
tal  damages  (B/D  =  r). 
To  determine  the  optimal  policy,  the  government  maximizes  the  social  welfare  function,’ 
(1’) 
with  respect  to  the  tax  rate  (r),  subject  to  the  Keynes-Ramsey  rule  (2).  This  gives  rise  to  the 
modified  Samuelson  rule: 
MCPF-l+q,-77,  & 
i  ) 
2 
ABK,,  , 




c8”  1fTIG-Q  G  )’  ABK,,]A  ’ 
(5) 
The  modified  Samuelson  rule  (5)  says  that  (the  sum  of)  the  marginal  rate(s)  of  substitution 
between  public  consumption  and  private  consumption,  i.e.  the  ratio  of  the  marginal  utility  of 
public  consumption  (vc,/G)  and  the  marginal  value  of  private  income  (l/C),  should  equal  the 
marginal  cost  of  public  funds  (MCPF).  The  MCPF  is  unity  if  Q  = q<; =  0.  If  the  role  of 
environmental  externalities  and  public  consumption  is negligible,  there  are  no  externalities  or 
distortions  present  in  the  economy  and  the  first-best  outcome  results.  The  optimal  (distortion- 
ary)  tax  rate  is  zero  in  this  case.  A  positive  weight  to  public  consumption  (qo  >  0)  raises  the 
MCPF  above  unity  ’  indicating  that  public  goods  are  more  costly  than  private  goods.  This 
distortion  induces  substitution  away  from  public  spending  towards  private  goods,  thereby 
depressing  the  tax  rate.  However,  a  positive  weight  to  environmental  damages  (vE  >  0) 
depresses  the  MCPF  below  unity  (if  vd  =  0),  as  taxation  reduces  growth  in  environmental 
damages  and  thus  boosts  the  supply  of  environmental  quality,  thereby  inducing  substitution 
away  from  private  towards  public  consumption. 
Consider  first  the  case  without  environmental  externalities  (~1~  =  0).  Given  that  8 >  G-A, if 
more  priority  is  given  to  public  consumption  (higher  qG),  the  national  income  share  of  public 
consumption  and  thus  the  optimal  tax  rate  rises.  This  depresses  the  rate  of  economic  growth. 
However,  there  is  also  a  rise  in  the  MCPF  which  depresses  the  demand  for  public 
consumption  goods  and  thus  attenuates  the  rise  in  the  tax  rate.  A  higher  productivity  of 
capital  or  more  patient  households  (lower  13) leads  to  a  lower  optimal  tax  rate,  a  lower  share 
of  public  consumption  and  a  higher  rate  of  economic  growth. 
The  general  case  in  which  environmental  externalities  are  present  (qE  >  0)  is  depicted  in 
Fig.  1.  The  first  equality  of  (5)  corresponds  to  a  negatively  sloped  demand  curve  (DD)  which 
implies  that  a  rise  in  the  MCPF  leads  to  a  decline  in  the  demand  for  public  consumption 
’ For  utility  to  be  bounded,  it  is  necessary  to  assume  that  the  rate  of  time  preference  exceeds  the  rate  of 
economic  growth,  i.e.  0-n  >O. 
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Fig.  1.  Marginal  cost  of  public  funds  and  environmental  quality.  Note:  Greater  weight  to  environmental  damages 
shifts  E  to  E’,  thereby  lowering  the  MCPF  and  raising  the  tax  rate.  Smaller  weight  to  public  consumption  shifts  E 
to  E”, thereby  lowering  both  the  tax  rate  and  the  MCPF. 
goods.  Hence,  the  optimal  tax  rate  and  the  national  income  share  of  public  consumption  fall. 
The  last  equality  of  (5)  corresponds  to  a  positively  sloped  cost  curve  (CC),  which  implies  that 
a  rise  in  the  tax  rate  raises  the  MCPF.  A  higher  tax  rate  on  output  depresses  the  rate  of  capital 
accumulation  and  economic  growth.  This  depresses  the  tax  base  and  raises  the  MCPF. 
Consider  a  shift  towards  greener  preferences  (nE  rises).  This  makes  distortionary  taxes  on 
output  less  harmful.  More  concern  with  environmental  damages  thus  shifts  the  cost  curve 
(CC)  downwards,  thereby  shifting  the  equilibrium  from  E  to  E’.  The  MCPF  declines  and  the 
optimal  tax  rate  rises,  which  in  turn  leads  to  a  bigger  share  of  public  consumption  in  national 
income,  less  capital  accumulation  and  a lower  rate  of  economic  growth.  The  decline  in  the  rate 
of  economic  growth  reduces  the  rate  of  growth  in  pollution  damages. 
Now,  consider  what  happens  if  society  attaches  less  priority  to  public  consumption  (Q 
declines).  Both  the  demand  curve  (DD)  and  cost  curve  (CC)  are  shifted  downward,  thereby 
shifting  the  equilibrium  from  E  to  E”. The  decline  in  demand  for  public  goods  makes  them 
relatively  cheap,  which  depresses  the  MCPF.  If  the  tax  rate  is not  too  large  (i.e.  7 <  O/A), the 
optimal  tax  rate  falls3  and  the  growth  rates  of  the  economy  and  pollution  damages  rise.  In  this 
sense,  there  is  less  provision  of  the  two  public  goods,  namely  public  consumption  and 
environmental  quality. 
3 If  0  >  TA,  the  downward  shift  in  the  demand  curve  (DD)  dominates  the  downward  shift  in  the  cost  curve  (CC) 
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3.  Public  abatement  and  public  consumption 
3.1.  Abatement  and  optimal  government  policy 
Abatement  policies  can  limit  pollution  damages.  Hence,  assume  that  government  spending 
on  abatement  (2)  reduces  the  emission-output  ratio.” 
where  I,!J is  the  elasticity  of  pollution  with  respect  to  abatement.  A  higher  elasticity  of 
abatement  implies  that  an  increase  in  the  national  income  share  of  public  abatement  yields  a 
greater  reduction  in  the  emission-output  ratio.  The  government  budget  constraint  becomes 
T = g  +  z,  where  g =  G/Y  and  z =  Z/Y  stand  for  the  national  income  shares  of  public 
consumption  and  public  abatement,  respectively.  The  optimum  government  policy  must  satisfy 
the  Keynes-Ramsey  rule  (4),  the  modified  Samuelson  rule  (5),  and  the  optimality  condition 
for  the  national  income  share  of  public  abatement: 
($,(Jp)=MCPF.  (7) 
Expression  (7)  says  that  the  marginal  discounted  utility  of  one  unit  of  public  funds  spent  on 
public  consumption  must  be  the  same  as  that  spend  on  public  abatement.  Alternatively,  (the 
sum  of)  the  marginal  rate(s)  of  substitution  between  public  abatement  and  private  consump- 
tion  should  equal  the  MCPF. 
3.2.  Comparative  statics 
We  denote  loglinear  deviations  from 
Loglinearising  (7)  and  7 = g  +  z  shows 
an  initial  equilibrium  by  a  tilde  (e.g.  z”=  dz/z). 
that  public  abatement  rises  if  the  concern  with 
environmental  damages  increases,  the  cost  of  public  funds  falls  and  the  rate  of  economic 
growth  rises  (i.e.  if  the  tax  rate  or  the  national  income  share  of  public  consumption  falls): 
z”  = A[+& -  MZ;PF  -  (yglz)A  ,  (8) 
where  y  =  Az/(B  -  Z-) > 0  and  A = (1  +  Cc,  +  y)-’  > 0.  It  follows  that  the  tax  rate  rises  if  the 
priority  given  to  environmental  quality  rises,  the  cost  of  public  funds  falls  and  the  national 
income  share  of  public  consumption  rises: 
~7”  = A[z(  ;i,  -  MZ;PF)  + (1  +  +)ga  .  (9) 
Effectively,  (8)  and  (9)  indicate  that  the  demand  for  public  abatement  and  the  corresponding 
tax  rate  are  low  if  public  funds  are  scarce. 
Upon  substitution  of  (8)  and  (9)  into  the  right-hand  side  of  (5)  and  loglinearising,  we  obtain 
the  cost  curve: 
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MCPF=A*{Q&  + (1  +r/c  -  MCPW[(2  +  +UsrWs”  -  (I  -  r&l)  1 
where  A*  =  [MCPF  + (1 + qG -  MCPF)A(+  + 2y)]-’  > 0  and  1 + qG -  MCPF  > 0.  The  cost 
curve  shows  that  the  cost  of  public  funds  rises  with  the  national  income  share  of  public 
consumption  and  the  priority  given  to  public  consumption,  but  falls  with  the  priority  given  to 
environmental  quality. 
The  demand  curve  for  public  consumption  goods  follows  from  loglinearising  the  modified 
Samuelson  rule: 
s”=  776 -  MCPF  .  (11) 
Society  is  willing  to  pay  a  higher  marginal  cost  of  public  funds  if  more  priority  is  given  to 
public  consumption. 
A  greater  concern  for  environmental  quality  leaves  the  demand  curve  unaffected,  but  shifts 
the  cost  curve  downward.  Since  the  MCPF  falls  and  g  rises,  it  follows  from  (S),  (9)  and  (11) 
that  z  and  r  rise. 
Proposition.  More  environmental  concern  with  pollution  damages  leads  to  a  lower  MCPF  and 
a  higher  tax  rate.  Both  the  national  income  share  of  public  consumption  and  that  of  public 
abatement  increase.  Environmental  quality  improves  due  to  the  lower  rate  of  economic  growth 
and  the  reduction  in  the  emission-output  ratio. 
Intuitively,  a  shift  towards  greener  preferences  raises  the  price  of  the  environment  which  leads 
to  an  increase  in  the  tax  rate  on  output.  The  marginal  cost  of  public  funds  falls,  since  taxation 
and  limiting  economic  growth  (i.e.  a  smaller  tax  base)  are  considered  less  harmful  if  there  is  a 
greater  concern  for  environmental  quality.  The  shift  towards  greener  preferences  increases  the 
national  income  share  of  public  abatement,  thereby  lowering  the  emission-output  ratio  and 
thus  limiting  pollution  damages. 
Less  priority  given  to  public  consumption  shifts  the  demand  curve  for  public  consumption 
inwards  and  the  cost  curve  upwards.  Provided  the  initial  priority  given  to  public  consumption 
is  not  too  large  (i.e.  qGA*  <  l),  the  shift  in  the  demand  curve  dominates  the  shift  in  the  cost 
curve.  Hence,  the  lower  priority  given  to  public  consumption  induces  a  lower  MCPF  and  a 
lower  national  income  share  of  public  consumption.  The  national  income  share  of  public 
abatement  rises.  If  the  effect  on  abatement  is large,  the  tax  rate  rises  so  that  the  decline  in  the 
rate  of  growth  together  with  the  emission-output  ratio  improves  environmental  quality. 
However,  if  the  effect  on  abatement  is  small,  the  tax  rate  falls  so  that  the  rate  of  economic 
growth  rises  and,  typically,  environmental  quality  deteriorates. 
4.  Growth-promoting  infrastructure,  abatement  and  the  cost  of  public  funds 
4.1  Productive  government  spending 
In  this  section  we  extend  the  analysis  to  allow  for  productive  government  spending. 
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a  growth  catalyst.  The  government  can  thus  counteract  pollution  by  raising  spending  on 
abatement,  reducing  productive  government  spending,  and  levying  taxes  on  output.  The 
production  structure  is  given  by  a  Cobb-Douglas  specification  (cf.  Barro,  1990): 
y  =  K’-“S”  zz  AK,  (14 
There  are  constant  returns  to  scale  with  respect  to  private  capital  (K)  and  productive 
government  spending  (S).  Labour  supply  is exogenous  and  can,  without  loss  of  generality,  be 
suppressed. 
The  government 
government  budget 
equilibrium  is  given 
finances  total  public  spending  by  a  tax  on  production,  so  that  the 
constraint  becomes  r  = g + s +  z,  where  s =  S/Y.  The  goods  market 
by  Y=C+k+G+S+Z. 
4.2.  Optimal  government  policy 
From  the  optimisation  problem  of  the  household  and  that  of  the  firm,  we  derive  the  growth 
rate  of  private  consumption: 
(13) 
Thus,  the  growth  rate  of  private  consumption  is  boosted  by  a  higher  national  income  share  of 
productive  government  spending  whilst  a  higher  national  income  share  of  public  spending  or  a 
higher  national  income  share  of  abatement  depresses  the  rate  of  economic  growth.  In  a 
balanced  growth  equilibrium  capital,  output,  private  consumption,  public  consumption,  public 
abatement,  productive  government  spending  and  environmental  damages  all  grow  at  the 
common  rate  rr.  This  implies  that  c =  13  +  p(  1 -  T)A,  so  that  the  ratio  of  private  consumption 
to  capital  exceeds  the  rate  of  time  preference.  The  private  consumption  to  capital  ratio  rises 
with  the  productivity  of  private  capital,  but  falls  with  the  tax  rate.  The  optimisation  problem 
for  the  government  is  to  maximise  social  welfare, 
u  =  (1  + q&r  +  log[(8  +  /?(l  -  T)~‘(~-‘))KJ  +  qG log&  -  s -  z)~‘(‘-~)KJ 
L92  8  8 
77EZ -@~p’(l-p)Ko  - 
0-r  1  (14) 
subject  to  the  growth  rate  of  private  consumption  (13),  where  use  has  been  made  of  the 
government  budget  constraint  g =  r  -  s -  z.  The  first-order  condition  for  the  tax  rate  (r)  yields 
while  for  the  national  income  share  of  productive  government  spending  (s)  we  get 
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and  for  the  national  income  share  of  public  abatement  (z)  we  obtain 
= MCPF  .  (17) 
Eq.  (15)  is the  modified  Samuelson  rule  which  says  that  (the  sum  of)  the  marginal  rate(s)  of 
substitution  between  public  consumption  and  private  consumption  should  equal  the  MCPF. 
The  optimal  national  income  share  of  productive  government  spending  is  less  than  the 
production  share  of  productive  government  spending  (p).  Clearly,  Barro’s  (1990)  result,  i.e. 
s = p,  is modified,  since  public  abatement  and  government  consumption  crowd  out  productive 
government  spending.  There  is thus  a trade-off  between,  on  the  one  hand,  public  consumption 
and  abatement,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  productive  government  spending.  If  there  is  no 
concern  with  pollution  damages  (z = 0)  and  if  there  is  no  public  consumption,  Eq.  (16) 
reduces  to  s = p.  Expression  (16)  and  government  budget  constraint  yield  the  optimal  tax  rate: 
T=P+(l-P)t+g  1-P  fj_T  77 
[  p-p)  ABK,]  ’  (16’) 
4.3.  Comparative  statics 
We  solve  numerically  for  the  influence  of  more  concern  with  pollution  damages  (a  rise  in 
qE)  on  the  optimal  policies  for  the  government  and  macroeconomic  outcomes  (see  Table  1). 
We  have  included  the  effects  on  social  welfare  (U = U,  + noUo  + qEUE),  which  consists  of  a 
private  consumption  component  (U,),  a  public  consumption  component  (U,)  and  an 
environmental  quality  component  (U,). 
Table  1 
Abatement,  growth  and  the  marginal  cost  of  public  funds 
Reference  A%=  Allob 
UC,  -16.03  -2.14  1.42 
u,  -19.92  2.90  -2.71 
4  -25.09  -2.03  1.00 
MCPF  1.74  0.02  ti.35 
m (%I  0.59  -0.29  0.13 
s (%)  20.80  -1.66  1.83 
= (%)  11.08  0.95  -1.06 
g (%I  46.33  0.86  -0.20 
7 (%I  78.21  0.16  0.57 
c (%I  7.06  -0.20  0.09 
A  0.35  -0.02  0.02 
B  1.94  -0.05  0.06 
Parameters:  /3 = 0.4,  0 = 0.03,  +  =  0.3,  q,  = 4,  no  = 4  and  K,  =  1. 
The  reference  column  gives  the  base  values.  The  other  columns  give  the  deviations  from  base  values.  U,,  Uo  and 
U,  refer  to  the  discounted  values  of  the  stream  of  present  and  future  values  of  log(C),  log(G)  and  -D, 
respectively,  using  the  discount  rate  8,  so  that  U =  U,  + qGUG + qslJ,. 
a More  environmental  concern:  nE  =  4  rises  to  nE =  5. 
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More  environmental  concern  boosts  the  national  income  shares  of  public  abatement  and 
government  consumption  at  the  expense  of  the  share  of  productive  government  spending.  The 
government  raises  the  optimal  tax  rate  which,  together  with  the  lower  national  income  share 
of  productive  government  spending,  depresses  the  rate  of  economic  growth.  The  growth  in 
pollution  damages  fall,  which  improves  environmental  quality.  The  fall  in  the  emission-output 
ratio  and  production  efficiency  combined  with  the  lower  rate  of  economic  growth  push  up  the 
MCPF,  while  the  greater  weight  put  on  environmental  quality  depresses  the  MCPF  -  see  the 
last  equality  in  (15).  The  former  effect  dominates  the  latter,  so  that  the  MCPF  rises.  The 
reason  is  that  the  substantial  fall  in  productive  government  spending  necessitates  a  relatively 
large  increase  in  the  tax  rate  and  pushes  up  the  MCPF.  More  environmental  concern  raises 
the  environmental  quality  component  of  social  welfare  at  the  expense  of  the  private  and  public 
consumption  components  of  social  welfare. 
If  society  attaches  more  importance  to  public  consumption  (higher  qo),  the  level  of  public 
consumption  rises,  but  the  national  income  share  of  public  consumption  declines  due  to  the 
rise  in  national  income.  The  national  income  share  of  productive  government  spending 
increases,  while  spending  on  abatement  is  crowded  out.  However,  total  government  spending 
as  a  share  of  the  national  income  increases  which  necessitates  a  higher  optimal  tax  rate.  The 
rate  of  economic  growth  rises,  since  the  increased  productivity  of  private  capital  more  than 
compensates  for  the  negative  effect  of  the  higher  tax  rate  on  the  rate  of  economic  growth.  The 
higher  rate  of  economic  growth  increases  the  rate  of  growth  in  pollution  damages.  Hence,  the 
environmental  component  of  social  welfare  declines  while  both  the  private  and  the  public 
consumption  component  of  social  welfare  rise.  The  increased  demand  for  public  consumption 
makes  public  consumption  relatively  more  expensive  which  leads  to  a  rise  in  the  MCPF.  The 
decline  in  public  spending  on  abatement  and  the  rise  in  the  rate  of  economic  growth  attenuate 
the  rise  in  the  MCPF  -  see  the  last  equality  in  (1.5). 
5.  Concluding  remarks 
We  have  investigated  the  interactions  between  endogenous  growth,  pollution  and  public 
finance.  Society  derives  positive  utility  from  public  consumption  and  environmental  quality. 
Without  government  intervention  the  decentralised  market  outcome  is inefficient.  There  is too 
much  production  and  pollution.  Government  policy  is  called  upon  to  correct  the  market 
failure.  The  government  employs  the  tax  system  for  the  two  fold  task  of  internalising 
environmental  externalities  by  depressing  the  rate  of  economic  growth  and  pollution  damages, 
and  raising  revenues  to  finance  public  spending.  Lump-sum  taxes  and  subsidies  are  not 
available,  so  the  government  has  to  resort  to  distortionary  taxes  to  meet  its  revenue 
requirement.  Hence,  the  decentralised  market  outcome  is  second-best.  We  analysed  how,  in 
these  circumstances,  environmental  policy  influences  the  setting  of  optimal  tax  policy,  the 
marginal  cost  of  public  funds,  the  composition  of  public  spending,  economic  growth  and 
environmental  damages. 
A  shift  towards  greener  preferences  reduces  the  marginal  cost  of  public  funds,  boosts  the 
optimal  tax  rate,  improves  environmental  quality  and  lowers  the  rate  of  economic  growth. 
Intuitively,  the  rise  in  the  price  of  the  environment  raises  the  tax  rate  on  output.  This J.E.  Ligthart,  F.  van  der  Ploeg  I  Economics  Letters  46  (1994)  339-349  349 
generates  additional  tax  revenue  and  makes  public  consumption  relatively  less  expensive  than 
private  consumption.  The  marginal  cost  of  public  funds  falls,  since  taxation  and  limiting 
economic  growth  are  considered  less  harmful  if  there  is  more  concern  about  environmental 
damages.  In  addition,  more  environmental  concern  raises  the  national  income  share  of  public 
abatement,  thereby  lowering  the  emission-output  ratio  and  limiting  pollution  damages. 
If  we  allow  for  productive  government  spending,  more  environmental  concern  may  raise 
both  the  marginal  cost  of  public  funds  and  the  optimal  tax  rate.  The  intuition  behind  this 
result  is as follows.  More  environmental  concern  increases  the  price  of  the  environment,  which 
raises  the  tax  rate  and  depresses  the  marginal  cost  of  public  funds.  This  effect  is dominated  by 
the  rise  in  the  marginal  cost  of  public  funds  caused  by  a  lower  level  of  productive  government 
spending  and  a  higher  level  of  public  abatement.  In  fact,  less  productive  government  spending 
lowers  the  rate  of  growth  and  raises  the  cost  of  public  funds.  More  environmental  concern 
thus  changes  the  composition  of  public  spending  away  from  productive  government  spending 
towards  public  consumption  and  public  abatement.  This,  combined  with  the  lower  rate  of 
economic  growth,  improves  environmental  quality. 
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